

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

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O R 241430Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8859  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
CSA WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
CMC WASHDC  
DISAM WP AFB OHIO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIRUT 4175

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, LE  
SUBJECT: FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320, (C) STATE 182544

1. THE FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED  
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, KEYED TO PARA 3A, REF A.  
AS INDICATED BELOW, WE SUGGEST AN FMS PROGRAM OF \$50  
MILLION AND AN IMET PROGRAM OF \$650,000 FOR FY 1980,  
IN FURTHERANCE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS EXPECTED FROM THE  
MILITARY SURVEY TEAM WHICH VISITED LEBANON APRIL 1 - 20  
TO STUDY THE COUNTRY'S NEEDS. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL  
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PREVAIL IN LEBANON, HOWEVER, ANY REQUEST  
FOR MILITARY AID MUST BE PROVISIONAL.

2. U.S. INTERESTS:  
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THE OVERRIDING US INTEREST IN LEBANON IS A VIABLE  
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ORDER WHICH WOULD END THE CONTINUING  
VIOLENCE THAT HAS WRACKED THE COUNTRY IN RECENT YEARS.  
THIS VIOLENCE HAS NOT ONLY HAD TRAGIC HUMAN CONSEQUENCES,  
BUT HAS ALSO POSED A THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY.  
MOREOVER, A VIABLE POLITICAL ORDER WOULD HELP PREVENT THE

GROWTH OF RADICALISM AND MAKE MORE DIFFICULT SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE AREA. THUS, OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES ARE TO:

-- INSURE LEBANON'S CONTINUED SURVIVAL AS AN INDEPENDENT NATION.

-- ASSIST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO REBUILD LEBANESE ARMY SO THAT GOL MAY ASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT LEBANESE TERRITORY.

-- PROVIDE A FORCE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND THEREBY PERMIT THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE.

-- PROMOTE FAVORABLE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND LEBANON.

-- ENCOURAGE A MORE FAVORABLE SECURITY CLIMATE FOR THE RENEWAL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.

## 2. THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY HOST GOVERNMENT.

A. THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE A UNIFIED VIEW OF THE THREAT IT FACES (SEE BELOW). MUSLIMS GENERALLY VIEW THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS AND ISRAEL AS THE PRINCIPAL  
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THREATS TO LEBANON'S SECURITY, WHILE MARONITE CHRISTIANS GENERALLY VIEW ARMED PALESTINIANS AND SYRIA AS THE PRINCIPLE THREATS.

B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT EVOLVED A DETAILED STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE VARIOUS THREATS. IN GENERAL TERMS, PRESIDENT SARKIS HOPES OVER SEVERAL YEARS TO BUILD THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO A FORCE CAPABLE OF CONTROLLING LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN ARMED GROUPS IN COUNTRY. NEITHER SARKIS NOR ANY OTHER RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ENVISIONS THE LEBANESE ARMY AS A FORCE CAPABLE OF CONFRONTING EITHER THE SYRIANS OR ISRAELIS.

## 3. THREAT AS PERCEIVED BY MISSION.

A. ISRAELI ATTACKS AGAINST AREAS OF LEBANON THAT SERVE AS A REFUGE FOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS WILL REMAIN AN ACTIVE EXTERNAL THREAT. ISRAEL IS LIKELY TO MOUNT AIR AND GROUND ASSAULTS AGAINST FADAYEEN BASES IN RETALIATION FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES LAUNCHED FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. SYRIA ALSO POSES A POTENTIAL MILITARY THREAT, BOTH THROUGH DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AND THROUGH THE SPONSORSHIP OF PRO-SYRIAN FEDAYEEN, LEBANESE

MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN GROUPS.

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INRE-00 MCT-02 SAA-01 /093 W  
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O R 241430Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8860  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
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CSA WASHDC  
CSAF WASHDC  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIRUT 4175

B. THE 1975-1976 CIVIL WAR EXACERBATED THE HISTORIC ANI-MOSITY BETWEEN THE CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES OF LEBANON, AND THE THREAT OF RENEWED CIVIL STRIFE REMAINS A CONSTANT FACTOR IN LEBANESE POLITICS. ISRAELI SUPPORT OF THE MARONITE CHRISTIAN FACTIONS AND ARAB SUPPORT OF THE MUSLIM FACTIONS FURTHER POLARIZE THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THE FEDAYEEN WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DISRUPTIVE FORCE, EXPOSING LEBANON TO THE DANGERS OF ISRAELI RETALIATION, AND DIVIDING THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OVER SUPPORT TO THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARAB CAUSE. PRESSURE FOR A GREATER LEBANESE COMMITMENT AGAINST ISRAEL WILL INCREASE IF PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WANE OR HOSTILITIES RESUME, BUT LEBANON WILL AVOID DIRECT HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL.

C. PALESTINIAN, CHRISTIAN AND LEBANESE MUSLIM MILITIAS POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. IN 1978, CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAVE HAD THREE MAJOR MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE SYRIAN COMPONENT OF THE  
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ARAB DETERRENT FORCES (ADF). BOTH THE CHRISTIANS AND PALESTINIANS HAVE MORE POWERFUL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS THAN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

#### 4. MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ENVISIONED BY GOL.

THE GOL SEES ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AS BEING: (A) A FIVE-BRIGADE ARMY, ONE FOR EACH MILITARY REGION, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF SUPPLEMENTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN THE MAINTENANCE OF DOMESTIC ORDER; (B) AN AIR FORCE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE ARMY IN THE ABOVE ROLE, AND (C) A NAVY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING LIMITED HARBOR SECURITY AND COASTAL PATROL.

#### 5. RELATONSHIP OF FORCE ABOVE TO US INTERESTS.

PRESIDENT SARKIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE UNABLE TO BUILD A VIABLE POLITICAL ORDER THAT WOULD ACHIEVE DOMESTIC STABILITY, THE OVERRIDING INTEREST, WITHOUT AN EFFECTIVE ARMY.

#### 6. DEFENSE SPENDING.

A. THE TABLE BELOW GIVES SUMMARY OF BUDGET FOR LEBANESE (LAF). (SEE USDAO BEIRUT IR-6-857-0181-78 FOR MORE DETAILS.)

ANNUAL LAF BUDGET (THOUSANDS OF LL	PERCENT CHANGE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR	PERCENT OF TOTAL GOL BUDGET
---------------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------

1973	246,716	-	22.88
1974	289,073	17	23.6
1975	314,905	9	19.6
1976	326,952	4	19.1
1977	255,068	-22	15.3

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1978	540,000 (ESTIMATED)	50	21.3
1979	3,808,000 (ESTIMATED)	700	NOT AVAILABLE

#### 7. PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES. NOT APPLICABLE.

#### 8. ASSESSMENT OF ITEMS PROJECTED. NOT APPLICABLE.

#### 9. ECONOMIC IMPACT.

A. THE IMPACT OF THE PROJECTED FMS PROGRAM ON THE LEBANESE ECONOMY WILL BE SLIGHT. IN NORMAL YEARS, LEBANON

ENJOYS A POSITIVE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (I.E., IT IS IN SURPLUS WITH RESPECT TO ITS TRADE AND FINANCIAL DEALINGS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD), AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RUNS A BUDGETARY SURPLUS (U.E., IT COLLECTS MORE MONEY FROM INTERNAL REVENUES THAN IT EXPENDS). IN CONDITIONS OF PEACE, THEREFORE, NEITHER LEBANON NOR ITS GOVERNMENT HAS A CASH PROBLEM. FURTHER, LEBANON'S INTERNATIONAL CREDIT RATING IS EXCELLENT AND ITS EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS SMALL.

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B. THE ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE AMOUNTS PROJECTED, ASSUMING A 10-YEAR DEBT REPAYMENT PERIOD, IMPLIES RELATIVELY MODEST CASH DEMANDS AGAINST ANNUAL GUDGET, NO SIGNIFICANT CURTAILMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS, AND NO DAMAGING EFFECTS ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR PROVIDING FMS FINANCING IS ONLY MODERATELY STRONG OVER THE 1980-1990 PERIOD. IT IS STRONGER IN THE CONTEXT OF LEBANON'S CASH REQUIREMENTS FOR 1979-1983, A PERIOD WHEN NATIONAL BUDGETS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE SURPLUS AND MASSIVE CIVIL RECONSTRUCTION TAKS FACE THE GOVERNMENT.

C. ORDER OF MAGNITUDE INDICATORS IN MILLIONS OF LL RELAVANT TO THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN FMS PROGRAM INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING (LL 2.90 EQUALS \$1.00):

1977 1978

(1) GNP 8,100 (ESTIMATED) NOT AVAILABLE  
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(2) TOTAL BUDGET 1,662 2,537 (ESTIMATEL)  
(3) LAF BUDGET 255 540 (ESTIMATEL)  
(4) LAF BUDGET AS PERCENT  
OF TOTAL BUDGET 15.4 21.3 (ESTIMATED)  
(5) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 700 (ESTIMATED) NOT AVAILABLE  
SURPLUS  
(6) BUDGETARY BALANCE (578) (ESTIMATED) (857) (ESTIMATED)  
DEFICIT DEFICIT

10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT.

A. SALES ENVISIONED TO THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD NOT INTRO-  
DUCE IN A MAJOR WAY NEW CAPABILITIES INTO THE AREA. MORE-  
OVER, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HARBORS NO AGRESSIVE INTENTIONS  
TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THE LEBANESE ARMY COMTEMPLATED  
BY THE PROGRAM WOULD NOT POSE A THREAT TO OTHER COUNTRIES  
OR TO REGIONAL STABILITY.

B. IN THE EVENT OF MAJOR DOMESTIC STRIFE BETWEEN MUSLIM  
AND CHRISTIANS, HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THE LEBANESE ARMY  
WOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF ITS EQUIPMENT. INSTEAD,  
THE EQUIPMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE COMMANDEERED BY THE COMPETING  
DOMESTIC FACTIONS.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS.

THE BUILDING OF AN EFFECTIVE ARMY WOULD REDUCE THE POWER  
OF THE ARMED GANGS WHO TERRORIZE PEOPLE THROUGHOUT LEBANON.  
IT WOULD INCREASE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR THE COUNTRY'S  
RESIDENTS. IT WOULD HELP ACHIEVE FREEDOM FROM THE FEAR UNDER  
WHICH EVERY CITIZEN NOW LIVES.

12. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES.  
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A. THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ITEMS HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED OR  
ARE BEING ACQUIRED:

- SPAIN: AMMUNITION.

- GREAT BRITAIN: ARMORED VEHICLES, AMMUNITION, AND AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE.
- FRANCE: MILAN MISSILES, AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS, TRAINING, AND AMMUNITION.
- ITALY: AIRCRAFT SPARE PARTS.
- SOUTH KOREA: UNIFORMS AND INDIVIDUAL WEB EQUIPMENT.
- AUSTRIA: UTILITY VEHICLES.
- JORDAN: ARMORED VEHICLES, UTILITY VEHICLES, AND TRAINING.
- SYRIA: RADIOS, SMALL ARMS, AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

B. THE FOLLOWING ARE LOANS OR LOAN COMMITMENTS, EXCLUDING USG ASSISTANCE, WHICH HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO LEBANON FOR ECONOMIC PURPOSES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 BEIRUT 4175

ARAB FUND \$38.5 MILLION (KD 11 MILLION)  
ABU DHABI FUND \$17.5 MILLION (KD 5 MILLION)  
KUWAIT FUND \$17.5 MILLION (KD 5 MILLION)  
EEC \$31.0 MILLION (25 MILLION EUA)  
EURODOLLAR LOAN \$150.0 MILLION  
IBRD (1973) \$6.6 MILLION (EDUCATION, REPROGRAMMED)  
IBRD (1973) \$33.0 MILLION (ROADS, REPROGRAMMED)  
IBRD (1977) \$50.0 MILLION (PORT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

ROADS, WATER)

13. LEVELS AND RECOMMENDATION.

A. MINIMUM LEVEL: \$30 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS AND \$200,000 IN IMET GRANTS. FMS CREDITS TOTALING \$30 MILLION WOULD PROVIDE EQUIPMENT FOR ONE LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE AND EXPAND THE AREA TO WHICH LAF COULD EXTEND SECURITY. SUCH A LEVEL WOULD LEAVE MANY UNITS UNEQUIPPED, HOWEVER, AND WOULD FALL FAR SHORT OF ACHIEVING OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
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OBJECTIVES. IMET GRANTS OF \$200,000 WOULD PROVIDE TRAINING ONLY FOR ABOUT 20 NYLSLYNUJ FAR SHORT OF THE COUNTRY'S NEEDS.

B. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: \$40 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS AND \$400,000 IN IMET GRANTS. FMS CREDITS TOTALING \$40 MILLION WOULD PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL INFANTRY BRIGADES, BUT WOULD DELAY SCHEDULED REBUILDING OF THE ARMY INDICATED ABOVE. AN IMET PROGRAM OF \$400,000 WOULD PROVIDE STAFF AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING FOR ABOUT 40 OFFICERS, STILL NOT ENOUGH TO MAKE UP DEFICITS CAUSED BY DISMISSALS AND RESIGNATIONS.

C. NEEDED LEVEL: \$50 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS AND \$650,000 IN IMET GRANTS. FMS CREDITS TOTALING \$50 MILLION IS THE MINIMUM AMOUNT WHICH CAN ACHIEVE OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES. THIS AMOUNT WOULD PROVIDE BASIC EQUIPMENT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES, AS WELL AS HELP EQUIP SOME CADRES FOR THE TWO REMAINING BRIGADES TO BE OUT-FITTED. AN IMET PROGRAM OF \$650,000, WHICH WOULD TRAIN ABOUT 60 PEOPLE, IS CONSIDERED THE MINIMUM AMOUNT WHICH CAN SUCCESSFULLY PROVIDE STAFF COLLEGE GRADUATES, PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED ARTILLERY AND ARMOR OFFICERS, AS WELL AS SMALL UNIT LEADERS FOR EACH OF THE NEWLY FORMING BRIGADES.

14. AMBASSADOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I RECOMMEND THAT \$50 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS AND \$650,000 IN IMET GRANTS BE PROGRAMMED FOR FY 1980.

B. BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PREVAIL IN LEBANON, HOWEVER, ANY REQUEST FOR MILITARY AID MUST BE PROVISIONAL. AS ALREADY INDICATED, CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAVE  
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CLASHED VIOLENTLY THREE TIMES WITH THE SYRIAN ADF FORCES  
THIS YEAR. MORE VIOLENCE IS LIKELY, AND WE CANNOT PREDICT  
ITS OUTCOME. IF THIS VIOLENCE SHOULD RESULT IN CONTINUING  
INSTABILITY OR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE LEBANESE STATE,  
MILITARY AID WOULD, OF COURSE, BE UNWARRANTED AND UNDESIRABLE.  
IF THE LEBANESE ARE ABLE TO BEGIN TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH  
THEIR PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, MILITARY AID WILL BE AN IMPORTANT  
MEASURE IN HELPING ACHIEVE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES.  
PARKER

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## Message Attributes

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